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WALL STREET: SECURITY RISK. By Hurd Baruch. Washington, 
D.C.: Acropolis Books. 1971. Pp. 365. $8.95. 
Wall Street: Security Risk by Hurd Baruch, a staff member of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, is an interesting and some-
times informative description of certain of the ills that plagued the 
· )4.- 2- Mich. App. 705, 141 N.W .2d 848 (1966). See also Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W .2d 
474 (Ct. App. Ky. 1951). 
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securities industry in America during the latter part .of the 1960's. 
Baruch attempts to set before the reader what he feels is 
an overview of: the continuing use and misuse of customers' funds 
and securities by their brokers; the securities industry's inability to 
process customers' orders promptly and accurately during the record 
trading volume of 1967-1968; the 1969-1970 financial crisis on Wall 
Street; the non-functioning of the self-regulatory system throughout 
the whole period; and, finally, the changes which can and must be 
made if the securities markets are to be made truly safe for the small 
investor. [P. xi.] 
Baruch's style alternates between a highly technical presentation 
which will be difficult for most nonexperts to follow and a muck-
raking use of purple prose and catchy phrases which one imagines 
are designed to help the book appeal to a wider audience. 
In reading Baruch's book one must not forget that he is presently 
employed by the SEC and participated as a government investigator 
in the financial history that he purports to describe. Baruch's role 
was and is that of a partisan and, as such, his presentation of facts, as 
well as his conclusions, become suspect. The way Baruch sees it, all 
of the ills that he describes may be attributed primarily to the mem-
bers and staff of the New York Stock Exchange. They are the "bad 
guys" who are constantly frustrating the aims and improvements of 
the "good guys." The "good guys" are-you guessed it, the staff and 
members of the SEC! By a clever juxtaposition of quotations Baruch 
paints New York Stock Exchange President Robert W. Haack as a 
villain continuously soothing the investing public with pious plati-
tudes while his minions go about their dirty deeds. On the other 
hand, SEC officials, among them Baruch's immediate superiors, are 
described as working with "intelligence, tact and selfless dedication" 
to prevent financial loss to hundreds of thousands of investors (Ac-
knowledgement). Baruch states that "their profound understanding 
of the securities industry made them the first to diagnose the serious-
ness of its problems and to propose the most appropriate remedies" 
(id.). Maybe so. But how does Baruch explain the failure of these 
same SEC officials to promulgate rules during the emergency dealing 
with the abuses prevalent in advertising and promotion, the over-
expansion of branch office networks, and the hiring of marginal, in-
experienced personnel? Baruch says that the SEC "felt that the 
primary responsibility in this area of business practice was one for 
the self-regulatory bodies" (p. 131). Similarly, how does Baruch ex-
plain the SEC's failure to make its net capital rule applicable to all 
broker-dealer firms instead of just non-stock exchange member firms? 
He does not; he merely says that it is "indeed unfortunate" that this 
vital rule was not made applicable to all firms (p. 176). How does 
Baruch explain the SEC's failure to move in and close down certain 
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of the firms perpetrating the most serious of violations? He says that 
if the SEC took such action it risked depriving the customers of those 
firms of the benefits of the New York Stock Exchange's Special Trust 
Fund-a dubious proposition. And so on, and so on. 
Unfortunately, what is least needed as the industry, the Govern-
ment, and private persons attempt to reconstruct the securities in-
dustry on sounder foundations after the recent debacle is a search 
for scapegoats. None of the parties involved, whether they represent 
industry, Government, self-regulators, or the investing public itself, 
can claim immunity from responsibility for the events that trans-
pired in the securities industry during the late 1960's. During these 
years the American securities markets were inundated with an orgy 
of greed and speculation that was fueled as much by the desire of 
ordinary citizens to get rich quick as by the irresponsibility of the 
promoters in the financial community who pandered to these ap-
petites. To single out one group at which to point the finger of blame 
for the inevitable debacle is entirely unfair. 
As the Congress, the Commission, and the self-regulatory agencies 
go about their work enacting new laws and promulgating new rules, 
what is needed is not only insight into the problems, but also some 
sort of mutual cooperation and trust among the different interests 
involved. Not to recognize that there are certain entrenched in-
terests which will fight tooth and nail to retain their special privi-
leges would be naive. It is equally naive to believe that we can make 
any meaningful progress if we merely superimpose new antagonisms 
and resentments upon those that already exist. Government officials, 
if they are to provide the kind of leadership and dispassionate involve-
ment that is so sorely needed, must avoid at all costs becoming ad-
vocates for their own special interests. Only in this way can we go 
about reconstructing our capital markets, which have long been the 
envy of the world, so that they may properly bear the even heavier 
anticipated burdens of the 1970's. 
Lewis D. Lowen/els, 
Member of the New York Bar 
